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1. Introduction 
Labor market characteristics like unemployment benefits, employment protection, union power, union 
coverage and union coordination have received considerable attention in the economic and political 
literature, since they offer a potential explanation for the relative low unemployment rate in the US 
and the long-lasting high unemployment in many European countries. Hence, there has been a 
substantial amount of empirical research aiming at identifying the effect of such factors on the 
unemployment level. See for example Layard et al. (1991), Addison and Grosso (1996), Bleaney 
(1996), Nickell (1997), OECD (1997, 1999), Siebert (1997), Scarpetta (1996, 1998), Blanchard and 
Portugal (1998), Elmeskov et al. (1998), Nickell and Layard (1999), Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), 
Daveri and Tabellini (2000), Bertola et al. (2000, 2002), Nickell et al. (2001), Baker et al. (2002), 
Chen et al. (2002), IMF (2003), Belot and van Ours (2004) and Nickell et al. (2005). 
 
One of the main results in these studies is that countries with a high degree of coordination of wage 
bargaining are associated with the best macroeconomic performance and the lowest unemployment 
when controlling for other factors. However, the evidence is inconclusive when it comes to identifying 
the effect of coordination at an intermediate level relative to a low level. Some of the studies find a 
hump-shaped relationship, i.e. that coordination at an intermediate level produces the highest 
unemployment, yet others find a monotonically decreasing relationship between coordination and 
unemployment. Hence, it is commonly concluded that the effect of coordination on unemployment is 
ambiguous.  
 
A common feature in all the studies listed above is that they only consider reduced-form-equations, so 
they cannot tell us anything about the causal relationship between union coordination and 
unemployment. However, the underlying assumption is that coordination only affects wage setting, 
and that the effect of coordination on nominal wages also is unclear. On the other hand, Nunziata 
(2005) – which to our knowledge is the only published article where the effect of coordination is 
estimated in a multi-country wage bargaining model – found a monotonically decreasing effect of 
coordination on real labor costs on a panel of 20 OECD countries. Podrecca (2004) analysed the 
importance of labour market institutions in wage equations for 20 OECD countries as well. However, 
she did not test for a separate effect of coordination alone, but whether union coordination made a 
difference on the wage responsiveness to changes in unemployment. She found no significant effect. 
Nunziata (2005) found that an increase in unemployment had a more moderating effect on wages 
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when there was a high degree of coordination, and that tax increases had a stronger effect in 
uncoordinated settlements. 
 
If this is true, i.e. that real wages decrease monotonically as coordination increases, but unemployment 
does not, then we might suspect that coordination also has a separate effect in the determination of 
prices. Figure 1 illustrates the equilibrium relationship between real wages and unemployment as put 
forward by e.g. Layard et al. (1991). The two curves show the anticipated level of real wages in wage 
setting and price setting, respectively. Equilibrium is where the two curves intersect, indicating a real 
wage level consistent with steady state in both the labor market and the product market. In the figure, 
changes in coordination of wage bargaining are assumed to affect both the wage curve and the price 
curve. If changes in coordination shift the curves as indicated, a lower degree of coordination will 
monotonically increase real wages, while the effect on unemployment is ambiguous, consistent with 
the empirical findings. Note that a higher level of coordination then has two separate effects on prices 
and that they are working in opposite directions; first, an indirect moderating effect through its effect 
on wages, and second, a direct positive effect on the price markup.  
 
There may be at least three theoretical justifications for including coordination as a separate 
explanatory variable in the price equation. First, as coordination between unions increases, firms 
realize that their competitors suffer from the same rise in wages; pass-through to prices may tend to be 
faster and more comprehensive, increasing the markup in macro. Second, since wage bargaining 
implies profit sharing (see Layard et al., 1991, Ch. 2), unions may wish to create entry barriers for new 
competitors. As coordination increases the unions may be more successful in creating these entry 
barriers, especially if the unions have political power. There may be several other motivations for the 
unions to fight new entrants as well. For example, the unions may want to protect their existing 
members against potential joblessness (insiders vs. outsiders), or they want to protect themselves in 
case they suspect that new firms primarily want to hire non-unionized workers. Moreover, unions may 
fear that new firms will challenge several of the rights the unions have accomplished throughout the 
years of bargaining. Third, there may exist other types of entry costs in a highly unionized labor 
market, i.e. the cost of negotiating rigorous tariff agreements. 
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Figure 1: Equilibrium in the labor market, the effect of coordination of wage bargaining 
 
 
Price formation has been subject to some research, although, interestingly, there seems to be no 
consensus about which variables determine prices at the aggregate level.1 Nevertheless, there has been 
little or no research linking institutional factors such as trade unions and the role of coordination of 
wage bargaining to price determination. This paper aims to correct for this deficiency in the literature.  
 
The empirical evidence presented in this paper is founded on panel data for 15 OECD countries 
observed from the 1960s to 2000. We use an index developed by Kenworthy (2001) as an indicator of 
the level of coordination of wage bargaining. The main finding is that coordination significantly 
increases the level of consumer prices. An increase in the wage coordination index from the lowest 
level (1) to the highest level (5) will induce a long-run price level increase of 21 percent according to 
the estimates in our baseline model. 
 
                                                     
1 See inter alia, Price (1991), Martin (1997) and Ashworth and Byrne (2003). 
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The remainder of the paper develops these points and is structured as follows. First, in Section 2, we 
set up an imperfect competition model for price determination, where the markup depends on 
coordination of wage bargaining and the relationship between import prices and prices on 
domestically produced goods and services. Then, after discussing the econometric methodology and 
data in Sections 3 and 4 respectively, we estimate the model in Section 5. Conclusions are drawn in 
Section 6. 
2. Literature and Economic Theory 
Price determination is essential to the understanding of complex issues of unemployment and inflation. 
The increasing attention of policymakers regarding inflation targets in monetary policy has 
necessitated further research in this field. Nevertheless, there is surprisingly little literature on the role 
of labor market institutions on price setting behavior. 
 
In the literature on price determination there are two central theories - purchasing power parity theory 
(PPP or the law of one price) and the pricing-to-market theory, or the markup theory. The purchasing 
power theory argues that domestic prices are determined in the long run by world market prices, thus it 
emphasizes the importance of import prices.2 The markup theory developed by Michal Kalecki states 
that producers set prices as a markup over average variable costs3, partly as an insurance against 
variability in input prices and partly to earn greater profits. This latter theory has become a widely 
accepted approach to price determination, and has, besides being a standard assumption in many 
macroeconomic models4, also been subject to considerable empirical testing.5 
 
Martin (1997) advocates, through his theoretical and empirical assessment of the UK economy, that 
reality is somewhat in the middle of these two main theories. He argues that interactions between 
domestic and foreign agents cannot be neglected when it comes to theories of price formation, thus 
both domestic costs and import prices are important in determining the domestic price level.  
 
We utilize the markup theory in this paper; by including an index for the coordination of wage 
determination, we attempt to investigate whether there is an omitted variable bias in the standard price 
determination model. To our knowledge there has been no attempt to study the role of labor market 
                                                     
2 See Dornbusch (1992) for further details. 
3 See Kalecki (1943). 
4 See for example Weintraub (1958), Okun (1981), Dutt (1990), Taylor (1991) or Dornbusch and Fischer (1994). 
5 See for example Scherer and Ross (1990). 
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institutions for the price setting behavior. However, some studies aim at describing their effect on 
prices in reduced-form-equations, i.e. inserting for wage determining factors in price-equations.6 
Nunziata (2005) for example, elucidated institutional factors as highly significant in influencing 
wages. He estimated the determinants of labor costs in 20 OECD countries, and found both a direct 
effect on wages, through wage pressure despite excess supply in the labor market, and an indirect 
effect via the matching process of unemployed individuals to available job vacancies. Furthermore, 
bargaining coordination, employment protection and benefit replacement ratios were significantly 
affecting labor costs and consequently wages.  Nunziata (2005) found that bargaining coordination 
significantly decreased wages, while employment protection and benefit replacement ratios 
significantly increased wages.  
 
Layard et al. (1991) consider the issues of wage bargaining and trade unions in some detail. However, 
there is no model explicitly linking coordination of wage determination and price determination. 
Nevertheless, the concepts of corporatism, trade unions and nominal inertia plus its effects on 
unemployment is discussed in great depth in this book. 
 
Ashworth and Byrne (2003) and Asteriou et al. (2002) specify and estimate price equations of OECD 
countries, but neither of the papers includes elements of wage-setting coordination. The estimations in 
both papers put a roughly 50-50 percent weight on unit labor costs and import prices in the price 
equation, respectively, which corresponds relatively well to the estimates in single-country studies as 
well (see inter alia Boug et al., 2006, and Bårdsen et al., 1998).  
2.1. The theoretical foundation of the estimated equation 
A formal derivation for the price equation is now presented. First, the standard consumer price relation 
(1) is put forward. CP is consumer prices, DP is prices on domestically produced goods and services 
and PI is price of imports. The subscript i denotes country.  
(1) ββ −
⋅=
1
iii PIDPCP  
                                                     
6 See Sen and Dutt (1995) for a theoretical model where bargaining power affects wages and where the wage level influences 
the markup. See also Bowdler and Nunziata (2005) for an empirical analysis where they replace unit labour cost in a price-
equation with wage determining factors. 
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The weight on domestic prices is assumed to be a constant β . Further, according to the markup 
theory, domestic prices are set as a markup over marginal costs. Unit labor costs (ULC) are used as a 
proxy for marginal costs7, such that: 
(2) ( ) iii ULCmDP ⋅+= 1 . 
Layard et al. (1991, p. 338) show that the markup, (1 + mi), depends on the elasticity of demand with 
respect to own price, i.e. that (1 + mi) depends on product-market competitiveness. In aggregated 
price-equations the markup is usually assumed to be either a constant or, in an open economy setting, 
dependent only on the relationship between import prices and prices on domestically produced goods 
and services. As argued in the introduction, we wish to explore whether coordination of wage 
bargaining influence the competition in the product market. We therefore need to specify the markup 
as a function of the degree of coordination. The exact link between coordination and the markup is not 
clear-cut, but one easy way would be to express the markup relation in the following way: 
(3) ( )
1
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where we have assumed that m1i = m1  and m2i = m2, for all I, and where CO is an index for the degree 
of coordination of wage bargaining. 
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Inserting the equation for domestic prices (4) into the consumer price relation (1) yields: 
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By taking logs of equation (5) we obtain (throughout the paper, lower case letters signify natural 
logarithms): 
 
                                                     
7 With a Cobb-Douglas production technology unit labour costs are proportional to marginal costs. 
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(6) ( ) iiiii piulcCOmcp ⋅−+⋅+⋅+⋅= ααδα 10 , 
where  
11 m
β
α =
+
  and 2m⋅= αδ . 
 
Hence, the level of consumer prices depends on unit labor costs (ulc), the price of imports (pi) and the 
degree of coordination of wage bargaining (CO). We will now turn to the econometric specification.  
2.2. An econometric specification of price setting 
We estimate the price setting using a so-called error correction model (see Sargan, 1980), where 
parameters related to the short-term price growth and the long-run price level are estimated 
simultaneously. The following shows consistency between the error correction model employed and 
the theory derived in the previous section. 
 
The error correction model used in the analysis is given by: 
(7)    ( ) ( )
,71654
131211
ititiitiitiiti
ititiiitiiitiit
zcpulcpi
COpiulculccpcp
εββββ
βββγτ
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−
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where τi is a fixed country specific effect, γt is a specific time dummy and εit is an error term. The β's 
are non-negative parameters and zit is a vector containing all other variables and dummies. ∆  denotes 
the first difference of a variable.  
 
The link to equation (6) is further illustrated by calculating the steady-state solution for (7). Let steady 
state be defined as: 
 
,0
,
,
2
==∆=∆=∆=∆=∆
=∆
=∆
itititititit
iit
iit
COzcp
pi
ulc
ερω
ρ
ω  
 
i.e. that unit labor costs, import prices and consumer prices grow according to constant rates, and that z 
and coordination remain constant. For simplicity, suppose also that γt = 0 in steady state. We can then 
express the steady state level of consumption prices in the following way: 
(8) ( )[ ] iiiiiiii COpiulccp ⋅+=⋅−+⋅− δγαα 01  
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Equation (8) is the long-run solution for the estimated price equation, and it is the empirical 
counterpart to equation (6). The detailed empirical results and interpretations are presented in Section 
5. 
3. Data Appreciation 
The bulk of the data in the paper is retrieved from the OECD databases8. The import prices are 
constructed by taking the ratio of the value and the volume of imported goods and services. While in 
almost all previous papers predominantly data for the manufacturing sector has been used, we use the 
OECD unit labor cost index that covers the whole economy.  
 
The coordination variable (CO) is retrieved from Professor Lane Kenworthy’s dataset (Kenworthy, 
2001), and constructed as an index from 1 to 5. The index draws on a variety of much cited references 
from the wage-setting literature, and is elaborated in the Appendix. The Thatcher regime in the United 
Kingdom in the 1980s is an illustrative case, which entailed a strong decentralization of the wage-
setting process, bringing the score for the UK from an intermittent high level down to 1 from 1980 
onwards. Figure 2 shows the coordination scores for each country. Four countries have little or no 
variation in the coordination scores. The four countries are France and Japan, which have a constant 
CO variable, and Canada and the US, which have coordination scores equal to 1 in all years except 
during the price and wage legislation in the 1970's. In the analysis CO is held constant also in Canada 
and the US since changes in consumption prices obviously would be influenced by the price controls 
and not necessarily the change in wage setting.  Hence, in our panel regression with fixed effects these 
four countries do not contribute to identify the effect of coordination.  
 
                                                     
8 OECD Economic Outlook and Main Economic Indicator (MEI) databases. 
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Figure 2: Coordination scores, 1-5 
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Source: Kenworthy (2001) 
4. Econometric Issues 
The strength of the evidence of an econometric model relies heavily on the error terms being 
independently and identically distributed. There are several potential sources of misspecification that 
have to be examined. In this section we address these issues.  
4.1. Unit root and cointegration 
Macroeconomic time series are rarely stationary and frequently characterized by trends. The variables 
in a balanced error correction model with a stationary variable on the left hand side must either be 
stationary or cointegrated, and we must therefore determine the order of integration of the variables in 
our model. Generally, any process that has a single unit root is said to be integrated of order one, that 
is I(1), implying that the first difference of the process is stationary.  
 
We have performed four different panel unit root tests; The Levin-Lin-Chu test (Levin et al., 2002), 
the Im-Pesaran-Shin test (Im et al., 2003), the Fisher-ADF test and the Fisher-PP test (Maddala and 
Wu, 1999, and Choi, 2001). The Levin-Lin-Chu test assumes common unit root processes; the others 
assume individual root processes. The results are reported in Table 1.  
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Table 1: Panel unit root tests 
N ull: Unit root cp ulc pi ur e
Levin-Lin-Chu, t-stat. 0.53 (0.70) 2.11 (0.98) 3.53 (1.00) 1.71 (0.96) -1.15 (0.12)
Im -Pesaran-Shin, W -stat. 2.37 (0.99) 6.04 (1.00) 6.19 (1.00) 1.67 (0.95) -2.52 (0.01)**
ADF - Fisher, χ2 - stat. 18.3 (0.95) 7.59 (1.00) 3.01 (1.00) 28.1 (0.56) 43.9 (0.03)*
PP - Fisher, χ2 - stat. 2.45 (1.00) 4.76 (1.00) 2.22 (1.00) 10.6 (1.00) 18.6 (0.91)
N ull: Unit root ∆ cp ∆ ulc ∆ pi ∆ ur ∆ e
Levin-Lin-Chu, t-stat. -4.70 (0.00)** -6.48 (0.00)** -10.9 (0.00)** -0.29 (0.39) -13.5 (0.00)**
Im -Pesaran-Shin, W -stat. -1.50 (0.07) -3.89 (0.00)** -8.21 (0.00)** -6.77 (0.00)** -10.0 (0.00)**
ADF - Fisher, χ2 - stat. 36.3 (0.20) 61.3 (0.00)** 116.5 (0.00)** 106.6 (0.00)** 138.4 (0.00)**
PP - Fisher, χ2 - stat. 29.9 (0.47) 48.9 (0.02)* 113.0 (0.00)** 46.3 (0.03)* 127.8 (0.00)**
N ull: Unit root ∆ 2 cp ∆ 2 ulc ∆ 2 pi ∆ 2 ur ∆ 2 e
Levin-Lin-Chu, t-stat. -21.2 (0.00)** -18.1 (0.00)** -18.3 (0.00)** -7.74 (0.00)** -22.24 (0.00)**
Im -Pesaran-Shin, W -stat. -20.4 (0.00)** -16.8 (0.00)** -21.4 (0.00)** -13.5 (0.00)** -23.2 (0.00)**
ADF - Fisher, χ2 - stat. 335.1 (0.00)** 267.5 (0.00)** 360.8 (0.00)** 206.8 (0.00)** 387.2 (0.00)**
PP - Fisher, χ2 - stat. 1043 (0.00)** 830.8 (0.00)** 2496 (0.00)** 288.5 (0.00)** 3385 (0.00)**
Panel Unit Root Test on (country-specific effects and linear trends):
 
Note: The Levin-Lin-Chu  test assumes common unit root processes (see Levin, Lin and Chu, 2002). The Im-Pesaran-Shin test (Im, Pesaran 
and Shin, 2003), the Fisher-ADF test and the Fisher-PP test (Maddala and Wu, 1999, and Choi, 2001) assume individual root processes. P-
values are given in parentheses,  * and ** denote significance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively. ∆ and ∆2 denote that the variable is in 
first and second difference, respectively. 
 
The null hypothesis of non-stationarity is not rejected for any of the variables that enter the long run 
part of the model, i.e. log of consumption prices (cp), log of unit labor cost (ulc) and log of import 
prices (pi).9 While the log of exchange rates between USD and each country's local currency (e) show 
signs of being stationary, the unemployment rates are clearly not. The same tests on the first 
differences are for the most part rejected. However, according to the Im-Pesaran-Shin test and the two 
Fisher tests, the null of unit root for the inflation rates are not rejected. The Levin-Lin-Chu test rejects 
the null with a significance level below 1 percent, while the test statistics of the Im-Pesaran-Shin test 
has a p-value equal to 0.07. In addition to the variables in Table 1, we use the price of crude oil 
measured in dollars, and ADF-tests reveal that this variable is I(1). Keeping in mind that these tests 
have low power, on most parts the unit root tests support the stationarity assumptions when it comes to 
the growth rates entering the dynamic part of equation (7). Furthermore, the tests also reveal that the 
variables in levels, which are entering the long run part of (7), are non-stationary.  
 
                                                     
9 As for the coordination indices these are sometimes constant for long periods, and as such are not applicable to unit root 
testing. However, as they are indices and therefore bounded processes, they will not introduce spurious non-stationarity to the 
model. 
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Pedroni (1999) suggests a suite of seven tests designed to test the null hypothesis of no cointegration 
in dynamic panels with multiple regressors and a rank equal to 1. The first four tests are based on the 
within panel estimator (see Hsiao, 1986). The last three tests are labeled Group Mean Panel Tests by 
Pedroni, and are calculated by pooling along the between dimension. The tests allow for heterogeneity 
of the long-run coefficients and autoregressive parameters under both the null and the alternative. 
 
While macro panels typically exhibit cross-sectional dependence, the panel unit root tests and the 
Pedroni panel data cointegration tests all assume cross-country independence. As shown in Banerjee et 
al. (2004) and Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2004) using Monte Carlo simulations, falsely 
assuming cross-sectional independence causes severe size distortions. We have computed the Pedroni 
tests using RATS codes written by Peter Pedroni, where inclusion of time dummies in order to control 
for this type of cross-sectional dependence is optional.10 The test statistics of the seven tests, both with 
and without time dummies, are shown in Table 2 in the same order as in Pedroni (1999). As can be 
seen from the table, the null of no cointegration is clearly rejected when time dummies are not 
included, while the tests are inconclusive when time dummies are included.  
 
Table 2: Panel cointegration tests 
Pedroni (1999) Panel cointegration tests
Test number 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Heterogeneous intercepts included
Pedroni stats. -1.9[0.06]* 2.5[0.01]** 2.3[0.02]** 2.1[0.04]** 3.8[0.00]*** 3.5[0.00]*** 3.4[0.00]***
Heterogeneous intercepts and time dummies included
Pedroni stats. 2.1[0.04]** -0.7[0.46] -1.7[0.08]* -1.7[0.09]* -0.1[0.92] -1.9[0.06]* -1.8[0.07]*  
Note: Tests 1-4 are based on the within panel estimator (see Hsiao, 1986). Tests 5-7 use the between dimension, see Pedroni (1999). The test 
are performed using Pedroni's RATS code (Pedroni, 2006). P-values are given in parentheses.  *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 
5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Also the Pedroni tests have low power, especially when 39 time dummies (as is the time dimension of 
our data set) are included. The tests nevertheless give some support to the assumption that the 
variables of the long run part of (7) are in fact cointegrated.  
4.2. Nickell-bias 
Nickell (1981) shows that OLS estimation may be inconsistent when applied to models that include 
fixed effects and a lagged dependent variable. The bias is of the order 1/T, where T is the number of 
                                                     
10 We are indebted to Professor Pedroni for providing us with the latest version of the code. 
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observations along the time dimension of the panel. The panel data set used in this paper is an 
unbalanced dataset, and the time dimension varies from 21 to 37 when lags of variables are included.11 
Hence, it is likely that the ‘Nickell bias’ will be very small. Moreover, Judson and Owen (1999) 
largely confirm this and show that OLS estimation of dynamic fixed effects models perform well 
for 30≥T , i.e. with a T dimension similar to ours. Even when T = 20, the fixed effects estimator was 
almost as good as the alternatives (GMM and Anderson-Hsiao). 
4.3. Poolability 
The pooled panel data regression is valid only under the assumption that the slope coefficients are 
homogeneous across countries. As shown by Pesaran and Smith (1995), if homogeneous coefficients 
are falsely imposed, the pooled estimator is inconsistent even if T approaches infinity. The test 
statistics of all homogeneity restrictions in our pooled model is: χ²(105) = 301.26 [0.00]. Hence, the 
test clearly rejects the null of homogeneous coefficients. However, as pointed out by Baltagi (1995, 
Ch. 4) the pooled model can yield more efficient estimates at the expense of bias, and one must 
therefore balance the two concerns.  
 
We have chosen to assume homogeneous coefficients. Our main objective in this analysis is to 
investigate the role of coordination in wage bargaining for price setting. Therefore, existing price 
equations constitute the most important benchmark in this process. We believe that the effect of 
coordination is best assessed if our price model otherwise replicate reasonably well the findings of 
others. The estimation results presented in the next section show that the pooled model is in fact in line 
with other empirically specified price equations, both in single country studies and when using a panel 
of countries. This indicates that the estimator of the pooled model probably has very little bias.  
4.4. Non-spherical errors 
The OLS estimator assumes spherical errors. Consequently, we must test the assumption of 
homoskedasticity and error independence in the panel regressions. We consider three cases of non-
spherical errors, namely serially correlated errors, contemporaneous correlations and panel 
heteroskedasticity.  
 
Because of the dynamic nature of our model specification the test for first order auto regressive errors 
in Table 3 indicates serially uncorrelated errors. However, there will most likely be contemporaneous 
                                                     
11 See the appendix for the regression period for each country. 
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correlations in a macro panel like ours. Therefore, we have included time dummies in order to correct 
for such cross-country dependence. In addition, we have included the price of crude oil as a proxy for 
economic shocks in the global economy. Furthermore, in the column labeled M2 in Table 3 we also 
present a Cross-Section SUR (PCSE) estimator. This estimator allows for unrestricted and 
unconditional correlation between the contemporaneous residuals. 
 
A panel homoskedasticity test using a likelihood ratio test between the log-likelihood value of the 
fixed effects specification with complete parameter heterogeneity (lrestricted), where the residual 
variances are restricted to be equal, and the sum of the log-likelihood values from the separate 
(unrestricted) models (lunrestricted), i.e.: 
 
( ) [ ] *,*00.05.592:)14(2 =−− edunrestrictlrestrictedlχ  
 
where the p-value is given in square brackets. The null of homoskedasticity across countries is clearly 
rejected, so we should use estimation techniques that are robust to panel heteroscedasticity. We have 
used the estimated residuals of the single country analysis to correct for the cross-country 
heteroskedasticity prior to the panel estimation. The correction is done by multiplying all variables for 
each country with the respective estimated residual variance. In Figure 3 we show the density 
distributions of the residuals for each country before and after this correction. As we can see, the 
correction envelopes reasonably well distributed residuals. The SUR (PCSE) estimation in M2 in 
Table 3 is conducted on unadjusted data because this estimator is robust to panel heteroscedasticity.  
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Figure 3:  Density distribution of the residuals before (top) and after (bottom) correcting for 
heteroskedasticity 
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4.5. Identification 
Unit labor costs (ulc) and the price of imports (pi) are explanatory variables in our consumer price 
equation (7). As the consumer price variable itself might influence unit labor costs, the ulc variable 
could be treated as an endogenous variable in the estimation of (7). Similarly, according to the pricing 
to market theory importers may set their prices dependent on the consumer prices in the country they 
are operating in. This may entail the use of instrumental variables to correct for potential simultaneity 
problems.  
 
However, the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test indicates that both unit labor costs and price of imports are 
exogenous variables. The test has two steps; first we estimated an equation for ∆ulc using its own lags 
and an index of the degree of employment protection (EP), level and lagged, as instruments (lags of 
∆cpi were found to be insignificant). An equation for ∆pi was estimated using ∆pit-2, ∆ et and ∆pot as 
instruments. Second, we included the estimated residuals from the two above equations as explanatory 
variables in the equation for ∆cp separately. The residuals from the ∆ulc equation had a t-value equal 
to 0.52 (t-probability: 0.60), and the residual from the ∆pi equation returned a t-value equal to 0.18 
and a t-probability of 0.86. Hence the residuals had no significant effect on ∆cp indicating that ∆ulc 
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and ∆pi may be treated as exogenous variables. In M4 in Table 3 we nevertheless report an IV 
estimator where we treat ∆ulc and ∆pi as endogenous variables.  
5. Empirical Results 
The sample comprises 468 observations, but 14 of them are accounted for by including impulse 
dummies to control for large residuals (t-values between 4.6-25.7) due to special events in the sample 
period. The estimation results are as summarized in Table 3. 
 
Model M1 is estimated using OLS with heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors (see Section 4.4). 
In model M2 we present a Cross-Section SUR (PCSE) estimation. While the model in M1 corrects for 
cross-sectional heteroskedasticity, the SUR (PCSE) estimation in M2 also corrects for 
contemporaneous correlations between countries. Since the standard errors of the coefficients are only 
moderately changed, the results from this estimation suggest that the problems with contemporaneous 
correlations in model M1 are rather small. 
 
In M3 we exclude the CO variable and include four dummies instead. DCO=2 is 1 when CO=2 and 
zero otherwise, DCO=3 is 1 when CO=3 and zero otherwise, and so on. When CO=1 all dummies are 
zero. Hence, the corresponding coefficients measure the estimated effect on consumer prices by 
moving from CO=1 to another level. While the effect of increased coordination is restricted to be the 
same regardless of the initial level of coordination in M1, the separate effects are estimated freely in 
M3.  
 
As explained in the previous section, ∆pi and ∆ulc were found to be exogenous variables using the 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test. Therefore, in models M1-M3 we have treated both ∆ulc and ∆pi as 
exogenous variables. In model M4 we nevertheless show the results of IV estimation treating ∆ulc and 
∆pi as endogenous variables. All exogenous variables, dummies and ∆pit-1, ∆pit-2, ∆ulct-1, ∆e, ∆pot-1, 
EP (an index of the degree of employment protection), EPt-1, BRR (the benefit replacement ratio) and 
BRRt-1 are instruments in this regression. The Sargan-test for the model specification M4 supports the 
validity of the instruments. Moreover, treating ∆ulc and ∆pi as endogenous variables does not change 
the results noticeably. 
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Table 3:  Panel estimation results of the determinants of consumer prices in 15 OECD 
countries, 1964(-80) — 2000. The dependent variable is ∆cp 
Constant 0.122 (4.5)** 0.133 (3.8)** 0.103 (3.9)** 0.107 (4.1)**
(cp-ulc) t-1        -0.039 (-3.2)**  -0.041 (-2.7)**  -0.039 (-3.2)**  -0.038 (-2.8)**
(ulc-pi) t-1         -0.018 (-4.0)**  -0.014 (-3.5)**  -0.018 (-4.0)**  -0.019 (-4.2)**
∆ cp t-1      0.271 (7.9)** 0.260 (6.8)** 0.272 (7.9)** 0.291 (5.3)**
∆ cp t-2        0.091 (3.0)** 0.086 (2.1)** 0.093 (3.1)** 0.090 (3.0)**
∆ulc              0.387 (18.1)** 0.411 (17.7)** 0.386 (17.9)** 0.358 (6.0)**
∆pi              0.028 (2.2)* 0.018 (1.1) 0.027 (2.1)* 0.031 (1.5)
∆ur              -0.025 (-3.3)** -0.030 (-3.6)** -0.025 (-3.2)**  -0.026 (-5.3)**
∆po     0.021 (3.6)** 0.021 (1.7) 0.022 (3.6)** 0.021 (2.5)*
∆ e t-1 0.034 (4.6)** 0.042 (4.6)** 0.034 (4.6)** 0.033 (6.1)**
CO t-1 0.0020 (3.2)** 0.0025 (3.6)** 0.0019 (4.1)**
DCO=2 t-1 0.0061 (1.3)
DCO=3 t-1 0.0083 (1.9)
DCO=4 t-1 0.0100 (2.4)*
DCO=5 t-1 0.0115 (2.7)*
Std. error in %
NAR-1 -0.286 [0.78] 0.026 [0.56] -0.364 [0.72] -0.708 [0.48]
Sargan test χ2 (7 )= 8.049 [0.33]na na
M4
0.94
M1 M2
0.90 0.90 0.90
M3
na
 
Note: The columns marked M1 and M3 show estimation using OLS with heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors (see Section 4.4). 
Cross-Section SUR (PCSE) estimation on unadjusted data is presented in column M2. M3 is identical to M1 except that there are dummy 
variables instead of the coordination variable CO. Estimation using IV on heteroskedasticity-corrected series and treating ∆pi and ∆ulc as 
endogenous variables is shown in column M4. All exogenous variables, dummies and ∆pit-1, ∆pit-2, ∆ulct-1, ∆e, ∆pot-1, EP, EPt-1, BRR and 
BRRt-1 are instruments relative to this regression. t-values are given in parentheses and p-values are given in square brackets. * and ** denote 
significance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively. N AR-1 has a standard normal distribution under the null of no 1. order autoregressive errors. 
The Sargan test (Sargan, 1964) is χ2 distributed under the null of valid instruments, and the degrees of freedom are given in the parenthesis. 
 
In the estimations, the price of crude oil is included both as a level and differenced variable. The price 
of oil may act as a proxy for the price of intermediate goods. This is relatively established in 
empirically estimated price equations. How it should be implemented theoretically in the analysis in 
Section 2 is however not clear. It is nevertheless found to have an insignificant effect on prices in the 
long run, and therefore excluded from the long-run relationships. The exchange rate between the USD 
and the local currency (E) is included as an explanatory variable in the short-run part of the models. 
We believe that changes in the exchange rate against the USD and changes in the world market price 
of oil may correct for some common shocks in the panel. In addition we have included time dummies. 
 
19 
The outcomes of the estimations demonstrate that changes in consumer prices in the short run are 
determined by changes in the price of imports (insignificant in M2 and M4), unit labor costs, the 
unemployment rate, the price of oil (insignificant in M2) and the lagged exchange rate. Higher unit 
labor costs, price of imports and price of oil, and a depreciation of the exchange rate are empirically 
estimated to increase inflation. A short-run effect of the unemployment rate indicates evidence in 
favor of a pro-cyclical markup. 
 
The long-run solution of M1 is shown in Table 4. The results are in line with the common finding in 
the literature; in the long run there is a roughly 50-50 percent weight on unit labor costs and import 
prices, respectively12. This means that an increase in either the unit labor costs or the price of imports 
of one percent increases the level of consumer prices by approximately 0.50 percent. In the table ci is a 
country-specific constant. 
 
Table 4: Long-run solution of model M1 in Table 3. Long-run t-values in parentheses 
LONG-RUN SOLUTION: M1 
 
cp = ci + 0.53 (-) ulc + 0.47 (3.2) pi + 0.053 (2.5) CO 
 
 
More interestingly for the focus of this paper is the long-run coefficient of 0.053 with a corresponding 
t-value equal to 2.5 on CO. This implies that a movement from, say, 2 to 3 on the coordination score, 
will increase the level of consumer prices by 5.3 percent. Correspondingly, a complete 
decentralization of wage bargaining, i.e. a movement from 5 to 1 on the index, is thus supposed to 
decrease the level of consumer prices by approximately 21 percent in the long run. Nevertheless, the 
effect of a change in coordination is slow. The loading coefficient indicates an increase in the price 
level following a unit increase in the coordination index of only 0.20 percent the following year. Half 
of the deviation from the long run solution is corrected for after approximately 11.5 years. As can be 
seen from M3, the restrictions in M1 of a monotonically increasing effect of increased coordination on 
consumer prices are clearly not rejected, formally: χ2(4) = 0.76 which corresponds to a p-value equal 
to 0.94. However, coordination has a slightly stronger estimated impact on consumer prices in M3 as 
compared to M1.  
 
                                                     
12 See inter alia, Ashworth and Byrne (2003), Asteriou et al. (2002), Boug et al. (2006) and Bårdsen et al. (1998). 
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On the whole, these results are quite remarkable, and suggest that the low level of real wages in 
countries with a coordinated wage bargaining system at least partly stems from higher prices. Seen 
together with empirical wage-equations, the results indicate that there are two separate effects of 
coordination on unemployment; first, coordination increases the (price) markup over wages, which 
lowers demand and increase unemployment, second, coordination lowers the wage markup over 
prices, which raises demand and decrease unemployment. This suggests that increased coordination of 
wage bargaining has a clear negative effect on real wages and an ambiguous effect on unemployment, 
consistent with the empirical evidence cited in the introduction. 
6. Conclusions 
The objective of this paper was to investigate the hypothesis that coordination of wage bargaining 
increases the level of consumer prices since union coordination may influence on entry barriers and 
competition in product markets. The empirically specified price equations estimated in this paper are 
based on panel data for 15 OECD countries observed from the 1960s to 2000. The main finding is a 
significant long-run coefficient (0.053, t-value 2.5) of the coordination variable CO. A movement 
from a completely coordinated regime to a fully uncoordinated regime will according to these 
empirical results decrease the long-run price level by 21 percent. 
 
Furthermore, the results indicate that the level of consumer prices in the short run is determined by the 
price of imports, unit labor costs, the unemployment rate, the price of oil and the exchange rate. In the 
long run, the price level is affected positively by unit labor costs and the price of imports. The long-
run coefficients of unit labor costs and the price of imports reconcile very well with the common 
findings in the literature, i.e. that the two variables are approximately of equal importance for the 
consumer prices.  
 
The finding in this paper may offer an explanation for why empirical research on the impact of 
coordination of wage bargaining on unemployment has been inconclusive. While increased 
coordination reduces wage claims, and hence lowers unemployment, it also increases the price 
markup, which raises unemployment. However, it is worth noting that the empirical evidence referred 
to in the introduction suggests that the best macroeconomic performance is associated with a very high 
level of coordination of wage bargaining. If so, the moderating effect coordination at this level has on 
wages outweighs the adverse effect it has on prices. 
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The price effect from union coordination can serve as an explanation for the sustainability of the 
coordinated regimes in many countries. A common characteristic of countries with a coordinated 
regime is that the employer organizations are encouraging the system, at least implicitly, and in the 
light of these findings it is easy to see why. As coordination moderates the pay claims and increases 
prices, the firms in these coordinated regimes may consider themselves better off due to decreased real 
wages. At the same time, there are most certainly institutional variations in the labor markets across 
the panel that can lead to different national effects of a hypothetical change in the degree of 
coordination. Exploring these aspects is beyond the realm of the focus of this paper.  
 
22 
References 
Addison JT, Grosso J (1996). Job Protection and Employment: Revised Estimates. Industrial 
Relations; 35: 585-603. 
 
Ashworth P, Byrne JP (2003). Some international evidence on price determination: a non-stationary 
panel approach. Economic Modelling; 20: 809-838. 
 
Asteriou D, Lukacs P, Pain N, Price S (2002). Manufacturing price determination in OECD countries; 
mark-ups, demand and uncertainty in a dynamic heterogeneous panel. City University London, 
Department of Economics Discussion Paper no. 90. 
 
Baker D, Glyn A, Howell D, Schmitt J (2002). Labor Market Institutions and Unemployment: a 
Critical Assessment of the Cross-Country Evidence. CEPA Working Paper 2002-17. 
 
Baltagi B, (1995). Econometric analysis of panel data. Wiley, Weinheim. 
 
Banerjee A, Marcellino M, Osbat C (2004). Some Cautions on the Use of Panel Methods for 
Integrated Series of Macro-Economic Data. Econometrics Journal; 7: 322-340. 
 
Banerjee A, Carrion-i-Silvestre JL (2004). Breaking Panel Data Cointegration. Mimeo. 
 
Belot M, van Ours JC (2004). Does the recent success of some OECD countries in lowering their 
unemployment rates lie in the clever design of their labor market reforms? Oxford Economic Papers; 
56: 621-642. 
 
Bertola G, Boeri T, Cazes S (2000). Employment protection in industrialised countries: the case for 
new indicators. International Labour Review; 139: 57-72. 
 
Bertola G, Blau FD, Kahn LM (2002). Comparative analysis of labor market outcomes: lessons for 
the US from international long-run evidence. In: Krueger A, Solow R (eds.). The Roaring Nineties: 
Can Full Employment Be Sustained? Russel Sage and Century Foundations, New York. 
 
Blanchard O, Portugal P (1998). What Hides Behind an Unemployment Rate. NBER Working Paper 
no. 6636. 
 
Blanchard O, Wolfers J (2000). The Role of Shocks and Institutions in the Rise of European 
Unemployment: the Aggregate Evidence. The Economic Journal; 110: 1-33. 
 
Bleaney M (1996). Central Bank Independence, Wage-Bargaining Structure, and Macroeconomic 
Performance in OECD Countries. Oxford Economic Papers, New Series; 48: 20-38. 
 
Bowdler C, Nunziata L (2005). Inflation Adjustment and Labour Market Structures: Evidence from a 
Multi-Country Study. The Institute for the Study of Labour (IZA), Discussion Paper No. 1510.  
 
Boug P, Cappelen Å, Swensen AR (2006). The New Keynesian Phillips Curve for a Small Open 
Economy. Discussion Paper no. 460, Statistics Norway. 
 
Bårdsen G, Fisher PG and Nymoen R (1998). Business cycles: real facts or fallacies? Chap. 16 in 
Strøm S (ed.), Econometrics and Economic Theory in the 20th Century: The Ragnar Frisch Centennial 
Symposium, no. 32 in Econometric Society Monograph Series. Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 499-527. 
23 
 
Chen Y-F, Snower D, Zoega G (2002). Labour market institutions and macroeconomic Shocks. Centre 
for Economic Policy Research, Discussion Paper no. 3480. 
 
Choi I (2001). Unit Root Tests for Panel Data. Journal of International Money and Finance; 20: 249-
272. 
 
Clements MP, Sensier M (2003). Asymmetric output-gap effects in Phillips curve and mark-up pricing 
models: Evidence for the US and the UK. Scottish Journal of Political Economy; 50: 359-374. 
 
Daveri F, Tabellini G (2000). Unemployment, Growth and Taxation in Industrial Countries. Economic 
Policy; 15: 47-104. 
 
Dornbusch R (1992). Purchasing power parity. In: Newman P et al., ed: The New Palgrave Dictionary 
of Economics, pp. 236-244. Stockton Press, New York. 
 
Dornbusch R, Fischer S (1994). Macroeconomics. 6th edition. McGraw-Hill, New York. 
 
Dutt AK (1990). Growth, distribution and uneven development. Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, UK. 
 
Elmeskov J, Martin J, Scarpetta S (1998). Key Lessons for Labor Market Reforms: Evidence from 
OECD Countries Experience. Swedish Economic Policy Review; 5: 205-252. 
 
European Industrial Relations Observatory website. http://www.eiro.eurofound.ie. 
 
European Industrial Relations Review (EIRR). Monthly publication. 
 
Ferner A, Hyman R (eds., 1998). Changing Industrial Relations in Europe. 2nd edition. Blackwell, 
Malden, MA. 
 
Golden M, Lange P, Wallerstein M (1997). Union Centralization among Advanced Industrial 
Societies: An Empirical Study. Data available at: http://www.shelley.polisci.ucla.edu/data. 
 
Hsiao C (1986). Analysis of Panel Data. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK. 
 
Im KS, Pesaran MH, Shin Y (2003). Testing for unit roots in heterogeneous panels. Journal of 
Econometrics, Vol. 115, 53-74. 
 
IMF (2003). World Economic Outlook. Chapter IV: Unemployment and Labour Market Institutions. 
 
Iversen T (1999). Contested Economic Institutions. Cambridge University Press, New Yorkz. 
 
Judson R, Owen A (1999). Estimating dynamic panel data models: a guide for macroeconomists. 
Economics Letters; 65: 9-15. 
 
Kalecki M (1943). Theory of economic dynamics. George Allen and Unwin, London. 
 
Kenworthy, L (2001). Wage-setting coordination scores. 
http://www.u.arizona.edu/~lkenwor/WageCoorScores.pdf 
 
24 
Layard R, Nickell S, Jackman R (1991). Unemployment – macroeconomic performance and the labour 
market. Oxford University Press, New York. 
 
Levin A, Lin CF, Chu CJ (2002). Unit Root Tests in Panel Data: Asymptotic and Finite-Sample 
Properties. Journal of Econometrics; 108: 1-24. 
 
Maddala GS, Wu S (1999). A Comparative Study of Unit Root Tests for Testing PPP. Stockholm 
School of Economics, unpublished. 
 
Martin C (1997). Price formation in an open economy: Theory and evidence for the United Kingdom, 
1951-1991. The Economic Journal; 107: 1391-1404. 
 
Nickell S (1981). Biases in dynamic models with fixed effects. Econometrica; 49: 1417-1426. 
 
Nickell S (1997). Unemployment and Labor Market Rigidities: Europe versus North America. Journal 
of Economic Perspectives; 11: 55-74. 
 
Nickell S, Layard R (1999). Labour Market Institutions and Economic Performance. In: Ashenfelter O 
and Card D (eds.), Handbook of Labor Economics, Vol. 3C, pp. 3029-84. North Holland Press, 
Amsterdam. 
 
Nickell S, Nunziata L, Ochel W, Quintini G (2001). The Beveridge Curve, Unemployment and Wages 
in the OECD from the 1960s to the 1990s. LSE, Centre for Economic Performance (CEP). 
 
Nickell S, Nunziata L, Ochel W (2005). Unemployment in the OECD since the 1960s. What do we 
know? The Economic Journal; 115: 1-27. 
 
Nunziata L (2005). Institutions and Wage Determination: A Multi-Country Approach. Oxford Bulletin 
of Economics; 67: 435-466. 
 
OECD (1997). Employment Outlook. Paris, OECD. 
 
OECD (1999). Employment Outlook. Paris, OECD. 
 
Okun AM (1981). Prices and Quantities. Brookings Institution, Washington DC. 
 
Pedroni, P (1999). Critical Values for Cointegration Tests in Heterogeneous Panels with Multiple 
Regressors. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics; 61: 653-670. 
 
Pedroni, P (2006). RATS Code for Cointegration Tests in Heterogeneous Panels with Multiple 
Regressors. Economics Department, Williams College, MA, USA.  
 
Pesaran MH, Smith R (1995). Estimating Long-run Relationships from Dynamic Heterogeneous 
Panels. Journal of Econometrics; 68: 79-113. 
 
Podrecca, E (2004). Labor market institutions and wage setting. Empirical evidence for OECD 
countries. Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Statistiche, Università di Trieste, Working Papers 
no. 101. 
 
Price S (1991). Costs, Prices and Profitability in UK Manufacturing. Applied Economics; 23: 839-
850. 
25 
 
Sargan, JD (1964). Wages and Prices in the United Kingdom: A study of Econometric Methodology. In 
Hart PE, Mills G, Whitaker JK (eds.): Econometric Analysis for National Economic Planning, pp. 25-
63. Butterworth Co., London, UK. 
 
Sargan, JD (1980). A model of Wage-Price Inflation. Review of Economic Studies; 47: 113-135. 
 
Scarpetta S (1996). Assessing the Role of Labour Market Policies and Institutional Settings on 
Unemployment: A Cross Country Study. OECD Economic Studies; 26: 43-98. 
 
Scarpetta S (1998). Labour Market Reforms and Unemployment: Lessons from the Experience of 
OECD Countries. Inter American Development Bank Working Paper no. 382. 
 
Scherer FM, Ross D (1990). Industrial market structure and economic performance. Houghton 
Mifflin Company, Boston. 
 
Sen A, Dutt AK (1995). Wage bargaining, imperfect competition and the mark-up: Optimizing 
microfoundations. Economics Letters; 48: 15-20. 
 
Siebert H (1997). Labour Market Rigidities: At the Root of Unemployment in Europe. Journal of 
Economic Perspectives; 11: 37-54. 
 
Soskice D (1990). Wage Determination: The Changing Role of Institutions in Advanced Industrialized 
Societies. Oxford Review of Economic Policy; 6: 36-61.  
 
Taylor L (1991). Income distribution, inflation, and growth. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. 
 
Traxler F, Blaschke S, Kittel B (2001). National Labour Relations in Internationalized Markets. 
Oxford University Press, New York.  
 
Weintraub S (1958). An approach to the theory of income distribution. Chilton Co., Philadelphia. 
 
26 
Appendix 
The data consist of annual time series from 1960 for some countries and up to 2000 for all, for a 
selection of variables for the 15 OECD countries indicated in the table below. Some of the variables 
do not exist for the whole period, and similarly some countries' variables are not available. The longest 
time series is for the period 1964-2000, and the shortest is for the period 1980-2000. Consequently, we 
possess an unbalanced panel data set.  
 
Most of the data (except for the CO variable) used in this paper is retrieved from or constructed by 
using the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Economic Outlook and 
Main Economic Indicators (MEI) Databases.13  
 
List of countries in the data sample 
COUNTRY REGRESSION PERIOD 
Australia 1968-2000 
Austria 1968-2000 
Belgium 1972-2000 
Canada 1964-2000 
Denmark 1972-2000 
Finland 1971-2000 
France 1972-2000 
Ireland 1980-2000 
Italy 1966-2000 
Japan 1965-2000 
Netherlands 1973-2000 
Norway 1976-2000 
Sweden 1968-2000 
UK 1966-2000 
USA 1966-2000 
 
                                                     
13 By using Xvision Fame 8.0.2, a programme licensed by SunGard Data Management Solutions. 
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Description of variables 
CP – Consumer prices 
The CP variable is constructed by using a Purchasing Power Parity index (PPP) and multiplying it 
with the consumer price index for USA (CPIUS), which is 1 in 2000. The PPP variable is a price 
relative which measures the number of units of each country’s currency that are needed in the country 
to purchase the same quantity of an individual good or service as 1 USD will purchase in the US, i.e. 
PPPi = Pi/PUS, where Pi and PUS are the price levels in country i and in US, respectively. The 
calculation gives us: 
 
2000_2000_ US
i
US
US
US
i
USii P
P
P
P
P
PCPIPPPCP =⋅=⋅=  
 
The denominator (PUS_2000) is the price level in the US for year 2000 and is simply a constant, which 
just adds to the constant in the regression. 
CO – Wage Setting Coordination Scores 
These data are retrieved from Professor Lane Kenworthy's dataset 
(http://www.u.arizona.edu/~lkenwor/). The data draw on a variety of sources, including Soskice 
(1990), Iversen (1999), Traxler, Blashke, and Kittel (2001), the Golden-Lange-Wallerstein indexes of 
wage centralization (Golden, Wallerstein, and Lange 1997), Ferner and Hyman (1998), the monthly 
European Industrial Relations Review, and the European Industrial Relations Observatory website 
(http://www.eiro.eurofound.ie). 
 
The coordination scores consist of an index from 1-514: 
 
1 = Fragmented wage bargaining, confined largely to individual firms or plants (Canada, 
Ireland 1960-69 and 1981-87, New Zealand since 1988, United Kingdom since 1980, United 
States) 
  
2 = Mixed industry- and firm-level bargaining, with little or no pattern-setting and relatively 
weak elements of government coordination such as setting of basic pay rate or wage 
indexation (Australia since 1992, France, Italy in most years)  
                                                     
14 Kenworthy, L. Wage-setting coordination scores. http://www.u.arizona.edu/~lkenwor/WageCoorScores.pdf 
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3 = Industry-level bargaining with somewhat irregular and uncertain pattern-setting and only 
moderate union concentration (Denmark in most years since 1981, Finland in a few years, 
Sweden since 1994)  
 
Government wage arbitration (Australia prior to 1981, New Zealand prior to 1988)  
 
4 = Centralized bargaining by peak confederation(s) or government imposition of a wage 
schedule/freeze, without a peace obligation (Belgium and Finland in most years, Ireland 1970-
80 and 1987-93)  
 
Informal centralization of industry- and firm-level bargaining by peak associations (Italy since 
1993, Netherlands since 1983, Norway in some years, Switzerland) Extensive, regularized 
pattern-setting coupled with a high degree of union concentration (Germany, Austria since 
1983)  
 
5 = Centralized bargaining by peak confederation(s) or government imposition of a wage 
schedule/freeze, with a peace obligation (Denmark 1960-80, Ireland since 1994, Norway in 
some years, Sweden 1960-82)  
 
Informal centralization of industry-level bargaining by a powerful, monopolistic union 
confederation (Austria prior to 1983)  
 
Extensive, regularized pattern-setting and highly synchronized bargaining coupled with 
coordination of bargaining by influential large firms (Japan)  
 
PI – Price of imports 
The ratio of import value in local currency and import volume is used as a proxy for the price of 
imports. 
PO – Price of oil 
The world dated price of Brent crude oil in USD per barrel multiplied with the average annual 
exchange rate between the local currency and USD, so that the variable proxies the price of oil in local 
currency.  
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UR – Rate of unemployment 
The OECD standardized unemployment rate gives the number of unemployed persons as a percentage 
of the civilian labour force. 
ULC – Unit Labor Costs 
ULC is an index of unit labour costs (2000=100) provided by the OECD. 
E – Exchange Rate 
E is the exchange rate given by USD ($)/Local currency; average spot rates. 
EP – Employer Protection 
The data comprise an index of the degree of employer protection. Data provided by Dr. Luca 
Nunziata, Nuffield College, University of Oxford, UK, see Nunziata (2005). The series are extended 
with the 1995 value to year 2000. 
BRR – Benefit Replacement Ratio 
The data comprise an index of benefit replacement ratio. Data provided by Dr. Luca Nunziata, 
Nuffield College, University of Oxford, UK, see Nunziata (2005). The series are extended with the 
1995 value to year 2000. 
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